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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : Case No. 900434-CA 
vs. : 
JAMES ALLEN DEAL and SUSAN : Priority No. 2 
ANITA DEAL 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the Circuit Court's adjudication that James A. Deal and 
Susan A. Deal possessed drug paraphernalia with intent to use the same in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1981). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Defendants' Motion to Suppress 
Evidence when the warrant and affidavit were so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause that no reasonable officer could have relied upon them in good faith. The 
standard of review for denial of a motion to suppress evidence is whether the evi-
dence taken as a whole provides a substantial basis for the finding of probable 
cause. State v. Ayah, 762 P.2d 1107,1110 (Utah App. 1988); see also State v. 
Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303,1305 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Did the trial court err in denying Defendants' Motion to Disclose the 
Identity of the Confidential Informant when the confidential informant's identity 
was essential for Defendants to effectively prepare their defense. The standard of 
review on appeal for this issue is a de novo review. 
3. Was there sufficient evidence to support a finding that the Defendants 
were the "possessors" of the drug paraphernalia and that they intended to use the 
same. The standard of review for this issue on appeal is whether in viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court of Appeals finds that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendants 
committed the crime of which they were convicted. See State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 
591, 593 (Utah 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 4,1990, a warrant was issued to search the premises of Defendants 
James A. Deal and Susan A. Deal (Record1 at 3). Shortly thereafter, police officers 
searched the Defendants' home and found drug paraphernalia and a plastic baggie 
containing a substance that field-tested positive for methamphetamines. (R. at 6-
8). On April 5,1990, the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Washington County 
issued a two-count Information, Count 1 listing the crime of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Second-degree Felony, and Count 
2 listing the crime of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
(R. at 1). 
After receiving the lab report on the white substance in the plastic baggie 
found during the search, the State on its own motion moved to dismiss Count 1 of 
the Information, which motion was granted on May 3,1990. (R. at 17,18, and 24). 
Because the affidavit did not indicate whether the confidential informant 
personally observed the alleged purchase of the methamphetamines at Defen-
1
 Because the appeals of both Defendants were consolidated, Defendants refer only to the 
record of Defendant James A. Deal for the sake of convenience, unless otherwise indicated. The 
record is hereinafter referred to as "R." 9 
dants' residence, Defendants moved the Court for an order disclosing the identity 
of the confidential informant, which order was denied on June 15, 1990. (R. at 51, 
53). Defendants also moved the Court for an order suppressing the drug parapher-
nalia seized during the search of Defendants' residence on the ground that the af-
fidavit and warrant lacked sufficient probable cause. This motion was denied on 
July 20,1990. (R. at 59; R. at 66 p. 22,23). 
Defendants' trial was consolidated and held on July 20,1990. (R. at 66). The 
trial court found Defendants guilty of Count 2 of the Information, Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia. Defendants were fined $200.00, and were sentenced to ten 
days in jail, eight days being suspended. (R. at 59-62; Record of Susan Deal at 55-
58). Defendants filed their appeal from the trial court's ruling on August 9,1990. 
(R. at 63; Record of Susan Deal at 59). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 4,1990, Officer Wendy Weston prepared an affidavit and a 
search warrant to search Defendants' residence. (R. at 3, 4). In her affidavit, Officer 
Weston stated that she had prior connection with a certain confidential informant 
who had been reliably used on three previous occasions. (R. at 4, para. 6). Accor-
ding to Officer Weston, this confidential informant saw a 1/2 gram of crank 
(methamphetamine) that was purchased at the Defendants' residence. (R. at 4, 
para. 5). 
2. Based on the statements in the affidavit of Officer Weston, Judge Richard 
Dobson issued a no-knock warrant to search Defendants' residence. (R. at 3). After 
the officers had searched the Defendants' home and during the trial in this matter, 
it was discovered that the confidential informant never observed the purchase of 
the methamphetamines at the Defendants' residence. In fact, the confidential in-
formant merely accompanied a third party to the home of the Defendants, and 
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some time after leaving Defendants' home, the third party told the confidential in-
formant that he purchased the methamphetamines at Defendants' residence. 
(R. at 66, p. 4, 5,14,15, 21-23). All these facts were known to Officer Weston at the 
time she prepared the warrant in question. (Record of Susan Deal at 62, p. 11-13). 
Officer Weston knew or should have known that she was relying on the hearsay 
of a third person with whom she had no prior dealings, and for whom no relia-
bility or basis of knowledge was ever established. 
3. Officer Weston utilized the warrant she obtained and act vely partici-
pated in the search of Defendants' residence. (R. at 6, 7). During the search, a plas-
tic bag with a white powdery substance was found and field-tested immediately as 
containing methamphetamines. (R. at 8). Yet, after the lab returned its report on 
the powdery substance, the State on its own motion requested the Court to dismiss 
Count 1 of the Information. (R. at 17,18, and 24). 
4. The officers conducting the search also found items identified as drug 
paraphernalia in a baseball cap hanging on the wall. (R. at 66, p. 35). The baseball 
cap was one of five or six hanging on little nails on the wall in what the State 
claims to be Defendants' bedroom. (R. at 66, p. 59, 60). Yet, aside from the fact that 
the officers found the cap containing the drug paraphernalia in what the State 
claims to be the Defendants' room, the State produced no evidence that the Defen-
dants had possession or control of the baseball cap or the drug paraphernalia. (R. 
at 36). Further, no evidence was produced at trial indicating that other occupants 
of the home, such as Defendants' 17-year-old son, were excluded from entering the 
room in which the baseball cap was found. (R. at 66, p. 59, 60). 
5. Finally, the officers did not take the baseball cap containing the drug 
paraphernalia into evidence. (R. at 66, p. 35). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendants argue that the warrant allowing search of Defendants' home 
was defective in that it did not set forth enough facts to allow a neutral magistrate 
to find probable cause for the search of Defendants' home. The State relied upon a 
confidential informant in preparing the affidavit though it knew that the confi-
dential informant never observed the purchase of the methamphetamines at 
Defendants' residence, and though it knew that the confidential informant ob-
tained her information from an unidentified third person. The State made no 
showing that it had used this third person reliably in the past or that it even had 
any association with this third person. 
No other facts in the affidavit indicated the confidential informant's basis of 
knowledge. There were no admissions against interest, self-verifying detail, or any 
other facts suggesting that the confidential informant had reason to believe that 
the Defendants sold this unidentified third person crank. The only thing relied on 
by the confidential informant in making her allegations was the hearsay of the 
unidentified third person. 
Further, the State failed to show that the confidential informant, herself, 
was reliable. The officer executing the warrant merely said that the confidential 
informant had been used reliably in the past on three previous occasions. No 
other information about these three previous occasions was listed in the affidavit, 
and nothing in the affidavit indicated how, when, or where this confidential in-
formant had been previously used. 
Defendants argue that Officer Weston was aware of the problems presented 
in the warrant by use of the unidentified third party, and accordingly, Officer 
Weston finessed the critical language in the warrant to read "that the confidential 
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informant did personally observe 1/2 gram of crank which was purchased at Jim 
Deals residence" (R. at 4, para. 5) (emphasis supplied). 
Because of Officer Weston's involvement, and because of the clear defi-
ciencies in the warrant, including a sufficient showing of reliability on the part of 
the confidential informant, the officers could not have in good faith relied upon 
the warrant or the affidavit in conducting the search. The evidence obtained pur-
suant to the warrant should, therefore, have been suppressed. 
Defendants also argue that because the State relied upon this unidentified 
third person in making the statements set forth in the affidavit, disclosure of the 
confidential informant was critical to the Defendants' preparation for the suppres-
sion hearing. Defendants needed to show that the confidential informant relied 
upon the hearsay of an unidentified third party, and that the State did not in good 
faith rely upon the warrant in searching Defendants' residence. The trial court, 
therefore, erred in denying Defendants' motion to disclose the identity of the con-
fidential informant. 
Finally, Defendants argue that the evidence produced at trial was insuffi-
cient to show that either of them were in possession of the drug paraphernalia 
with intent to use the same. The baseball cap in which the drug paraphernalia was 
located was never taken into evidence. The baseball cap was hanging among five 
or six other baseball caps, and the State made no showing that other parties were 
excluded from the area in which the baseball cap was located. Moreover, the posi-
tion of the baseball cap in relation to other objects in what the State claims to be 
the Defendants' room was never established. The area in which the baseball cap 
was located was a common area, not under the control of the Defendants, and the 
trial court erred in finding that the Defendants were in possession of the drug 
paraphernalia with intent to use the same. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE WARRANT TO SEARCH 
DEFENDANTS' RESIDENCE IS SO LACKING IN PROBABLE 
CAUSE THAT THE OFFICERS COULD NOT HAVE RELIED UPON 
THE WARRANT IN GOOD FAITH WHEN EXECUTING THE 
WARRANT, AND THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO 
THE WARRANT. 
The Fourth Amendment requires that "no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." U.S. Const, amend. 
IV (emphasis supplied); See also Utah Const, art. I, § 14. The probable cause stan-
dard requires "the issuing magistrate to make a reasonable determination whether 
'there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place.'" State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 56, 57 (Utah App. 1989). 
On an appeal for failure to suppress evidence, "[t]he role of the review-
ing court is not to conduct a 'de novo probable-cause determination,' but to de-
termine 'whether the evidence viewed as a whole' provides a 'substantial basis' 
for the finding of probable cause." State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah App. 
1988). Yet, "reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that 
does not 'provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the exis-
tence of probable cause.'" State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App. 1989) 
(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, reh,g denied , 468 U.S. 1250 (1984). If 
an affidavit is so lacking in probable cause that it could not have been reasonably 
relied upon by the executing officers, evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant 
must be suppressed. 
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A. THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT HAD NO PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AFFIDAVIT, 
AND NO OTHER FACTS OR DETAIL IN THE AFFIDAVIT 
PROVIDED THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S BASIS OF 
KNOWLEDGE. 
In his concurring opinion to Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), 
Justice White noted that there are two possible ways that an informant's basis of 
knowledge may be established so that a neutral magistrate may make the probable 
cause determination. 
If the affidavit rests on hearsay—an informant's report—what 
is necessary under Aguilar is one of two things: the informant 
must declare either (1) that he has himself seen or perceived 
the fact or facts asserted; or (2) that his information is hearsay, 
but there is good reason for believing it—perhaps one of the 
usual grounds for crediting hearsay information. The first 
presents few problems: since the report, although hearsay, 
purports to be first-hand observation, remaining doubt centers 
on the honesty of the informant, and that worry is dissipated by 
the officer's previous experience with the informant. The other 
basis for accepting the informant's report is more complicated. 
But, if, for example, the informer's hearsay comes from one of 
the actors in the crime in the nature of admission against interest, 
the affidavit giving this information should be held sufficient. 
Id. at 425. If the informant had personal knowledge of the facts contained in the 
affidavit, no inquiry into the self-verifying detail, admission against interest or 
other corroborating evidence is necessary. 
Moreover, if more than one informant is relied upon to establish the 
facts in the affidavit, the personal knowledge of each informant must be set forth. 
As Wayne R. LaFave explained in his treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 
"It is not unusual for an affidavit of a law enforcement officer 
to contain hearsay information from an informant, which, in 
turn, is based on other information gathered by that informant," 
and thus the judicial officer "need not categorically reject this 
double hearsay information." Rather, it must be determined if 
there is "sufficient information so that both levels of hearsay" 
may be properly relied upon. Essentially the same approach is 
called for when there is a longer chain of hearsay, as where 
what informant A said to informant B was passed on to infor-
mant C who then told informant D who in turn told officer E. 
Assuming officer E is the affiant or is testifying upon a motion 
to suppress, his task is to show veracity and basis of knowledge 
"at each level." (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted). 
1. W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.3(d) at 668 (1987). 
The affidavit in question never set forth the personal knowledge of the 
confidential informant. It provided only that the informant "did personally ob-
serve 1/2 gram of crank which was purchased at Jim Deal's residence." (R. at 4, 
para. 5) (emphasis supplied). From reading the affidavit, it is not clear whether 
the informant ever observed the crank being purchased at the Defendants' home. 
Indeed, at the suppression hearing, the State indicated that the confidential infor-
mant never entered into the Defendants' home and never observed the purchase 
of the crank. The confidential informant merely accompanied a third party to the 
Defendants' home, waited outside while the alleged purchase was made, and then 
some time afterward was informed by the third person that he purchased crank at 
the Defendants' home. (R. at 66, p. 4, 5,14,15, 21-23). No other evidence was pro-
duced at trial indicating that the informant knew that the third person obtained 
the crank from the Defendants' residence. Further, the facts involving the third 
person were never disclosed to the magistrate issuing the warrant though the offi-
cers were aware of those facts. Rather than disclosing those facts, the affiant, 
Officer Weston, phrased the critical sentence to read that the confidential infor-
mant "did personally observe the 1/2 gram of crank which was purchased at Jim 
Deal's residence" (R. at 4, para. 5) (emphasis supplied). Clearly the officer did not 
conduct herself with complete candor. See State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190,191 
(Utah 1986). The simple fact is that the confidential informant had no personal 
knowledge of the facts alleged in the affidavit or any facts sufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause for the search of Defendants' residence. 
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Moreover, the affidavit sets forth no personal verification of the officer 
executing the warrant or any other information that supports the confidential 
informant's basis of knowledge. Cf. State v. Bailey, 675 R2d 1203, 1204, 1206 (Utah 
1984). The only self-verifying detail mentioned in the warrant is the Defendants' 
residence. Such detail is innocuous. See State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 140 (Wash. 
1984). The detail listed in the present affidavit is even less substantial than that 
relied on by the officer in Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304. The confidential informant 
in this case simply had no personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the affidavit, 
and no other facts or detail in the affidavit provided the confidential informant's 
basis of knowledge. 
B. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANT'S VERACITY AND RELIABILITY, 
The confidential informant's veracity and reliability may be established 
by his track record or any declaration against penal interest. Jackson, 688 P.2d at 
140; 1 W. LaFave, § 3.3(b) and (c). 
No facts in the affidavit even suggest that the confidential informant 
made any admissions against penal interest. Neither did the State claim any such 
admissions against penal interest. The only indication of the confidential infor-
mant's veracity in the entire affidavit is in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the affidavit. 
Paragraph 6 provides that the confidential informant has given accurate informa-
tion on three previous occasions. In paragraph 7 of the affidavit, the officer sug-
gests that the confidential informant is reliable because the officer received 
numerous reports from other confidential informants and citizens that the Defen-
dants were dealing in crank. (R. at 4). 
A mere recitation that the confidential informant was reliably used in 
the past is insufficient to establish the confidential informant's veracity and reli-
ability. 
The "reliable information in the past" recital lacks any 
factual indication of how reliable the informer is. The 
magistrate is, in effect, relying upon the factual deter-
mination of the arresting officer that the informer is 
sufficiently reliable, and not upon his own independent 
judicial determination. This does not square either with 
the Aguilar demand for "underlying circumstances" or with 
the requirement that the essential facts supporting the 
assertion of probable cause be made known to the reviewing 
magistrate. Where reliability is important, the facts sup-
porting reliability are as essential as any others to a showing 
of probable cause. With such facts, the magistrate can chal-
lenge the reasonableness of the officer's belief in his informer's 
reliability. When the further possibility is considered that an 
officer has not made a good-faith assessment of the informer's 
reliability, or may even know him to be unreliable, the 
dangers in acceptance of vague averments of reliability become 
even more obvious. Judicial acceptance may tempt officers to 
make superficial averments of reliability without proper 
support; and some officers, while they may be above whole-
sale fabrication, may not be averse to some stretching of the 
truth on occasion. (Emphasis supplied). 
1 W. LaFave, § 33(b) at 636, 637; see also State v. Bowen, 538 R2d 1336,1337 (Colo. 
1975); State v. Woodall, 666 P.2d 364, 366 (Wash. 1983). See also R. at 7 (the affiant 
was the officer who executed the search). Though the statement in paragraph 6 
indicates how many times the confidential informant was used, it does not indi-
cate when the confidential informant was last used or the circumstances surroun-
ding her last use. Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1306. The conclusory assertions of reli-
ability in paragraph 6 are insufficient for any magistrate to determine the confi-
dential informant's veracity and reliability. 
Finally, the alleged tips from other confidential informants and citizens 
in paragraph 7 of the affidavit are fraught with the very same problems that the 
confidential informant's tip is faced with in paragraph 6 of the affidavit. There is 
simply no showing of "how, when or where the information was obtained." No 
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reasonable officer executing this warrant could have relied upon this warrant in 
good faith. 
C. THOUGH RIGID ADHERENCE TO THE AGUILAR SPINELLI 
TEST IS NO LONGER REQUIRED, THE CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANT'S VERACITY AND BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE 
ARE STILL RELEVANT FACTORS IN DETERMINING PROBABLE 
CAUSE, AND A WARRANT LACKING SUFFICIENT FACTS TO 
SHOW BOTH THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS VERACITY 
AND BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE CANNOT BE RELIED UPON BY 
THE EXECUTING OFFICER IN GOOD FAITH. 
Though the United States Supreme Court rejected the rigid Aguilar 
Spinelli test in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and though the Utah Supreme 
Court has similarly rejected the rigid Aguilar Spinelli test beginning with its deci-
sion in State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1983), a showing of the confidential 
informant's veracity and reliability is still relevant in the probable cause determi-
nation. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Utah 1985) (Stewart J., dissenting); 
see also Ayala, 762 P.2d at 1109; Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57. The affidavit "must con-
tain specific facts sufficient to support a determination by a neutrcil magistrate that 
probable cause exists." Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304. If the magistrate merely rati-
fies the bare conclusions of others, he becomes a "rubber stamp" for the police. Id. 
Defendants contend that the facts available to the magistrate in his prob-
able cause determination were so lacking in any showing of the confidential in-
formant's veracity and basis of knowledge that the magistrate could not have rea-
sonably relied upon those facts in finding that probable cause for search of Defen-
dants' residence existed. Moreover, no reasonable officer acting in good faith 
could have relied upon this warrant in executing the search. This is especially true 
since the officer executing the search was also the affiant and was aware that the 
confidential informant relied solely on hearsay in making her statements. 
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Moreover, the warrant was merely a form on the officer's computer, and 
it is clear from reading the warrant that not only are the facts insufficient for sup-
plying the confidential informant's veracity and basis of knowledge, but that the 
warrant is overly broad. It allows search for marijuana, cocaine and other con-
trolled substances, and the affidavit provides that these substances may be found 
on the Defendants' premises, vehicle, person, and container. (See R. at 4; R. at 66, 
p . l l , 12,15-18). Although forms on a computer are helpful, the officers using 
those forms must be responsible when filling them out. This warrant was simply 
overly broad. See State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985). This warrant 
simply did not allow the officers searching the Defendants' residence to conduct 
that search in good faith. The trial court, therefore, erred in failing to suppress the 
evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. 
POINT II 
DISCLOSURE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S IDENTITY 
WAS ESSENTIAL TO A FAIR DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES 
IN THIS CASE AND MATERIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS' DEFENSE; 
THE TRIAL COURT, THEREFORE, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN DENYING DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO DISCLOSE THE IDENTITY 
OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT. 
In State v. Forshee, 611 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed the privilege of nondisclosure of an informer's identity. The Court said: 
The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and pro-
tection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. 
The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to 
communicate their knowledge of the commission of 
crimes to law enforcement officials and, by preserving 
their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obli-
gation. 
The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying 
purpose. Thus, where a disclosure of the contents of a 
communication will not tend to reveal the identity of 
an informer, the contents are not privileged. Likewise, 
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once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to 
those who would have cause to resent the communica-
tion, the privilege is no longer applicable. 
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege 
arises from the fundamental requirement of fairness. 
Where disclosure of an informer's identity, or of contents 
of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense 
of an accused or is essential to a fair determination of a 
cause, the privilege must give way, (Emphasis supplied). 
Id. at 1224 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)). 
In the present case, disclosure of the informant's identity was necessary 
to a fair determination of this case and material to the Defendants' defense. A 
close reading of paragraph 5 of the affidavit reveals that the confidential infor-
mant never observed the 1/2 gram of crank being purchased at the Defendants' 
residence. It only states that she "did personally observe the 1/2 gram of crank 
which was purchased at Jim Deal's residence" (R. at 4, para. 5) (emphasis sup-
plied). Nothing in the affidavit or in the police report indicates that the confiden-
tial informant personally observed the purchase at Defendants' residence. (R. at 1-
10). Neither does anything in the affidavit or police report indicate the circum-
stances surrounding the confidential informant's alleged personal observation of 
the purchase of the crank. (R. at 1-10; see also Dronehurg, 781 P.2d at 1306). Given 
the fact that indeed the confidential informant never observed the purchase of the 
crank at the Defendants' residence, and given the fact that the confidential infor-
mant merely observed the crank in the hands of a third party who then told the 
confidential informant that he purchased the crank at the Defendants' residence, 
{see R. at 66, p. at 4, 5,14,15, 21-23), it was essential that the confidential infor-
mant's identity be disclosed so that the Defendants could establish that the confi-
dential informant merely relied upon hearsay and casual rumor in making her 
assertions set forth in the affidavit and so that Defendants could establish that the 
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police did not act in good faith reliance on the warrant when conducting the 
search. 
At the suppression hearing, Defendants had a right to establish that the 
confidential informant had no idea whether the third person, before entering the 
Defendants' home, was already in possession of crank. And if the confidential in-
formant claimed that she did have such knowledge, Defendants had a right to 
ascertain how she came about that knowledge: whether she searched the third 
person before entering the Defendants' home, whether she merely relied upon the 
third person's assurances, or whether she learned of the third person's possession 
and purchase of the crank through yet another party. Defendants had a right to 
this information to properly prepare for the suppression hearing, and the trial 
court erred in denying Defendants' Motion to Disclose the Confidential Infor-
mant's Identity. 
POINT III 
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT EITHER DEFENDANT "POSSESSED" THE 
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA "WITH INTENT TO USE"; 
DEFENDANTS' CONVICTIONS MUST THEREFORE BE 
OVERTURNED. 
The statute under which the Defendants were convicted provides that it 
is "unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug parapher-
nalia." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1981); see also Addendum 3. Given that the 
State presented no evidence that either Defendant actually used the drug parapher-
nalia, this statute requires the State to show two things: (1) possession or construc-
tive possession of drug paraphernalia; and (2) an intention to use the drug para-
phernalia. Defendants contend that the evidence on these two elements of the 
crime was so lacking that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
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the verdict, "reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant[s] committed the crime of which they were convicted." See State v. 
Cantu, 750 R2d 591, 593 (Utah 1988). 
Because the Defendants did not have actual possession of the drug para-
phernalia, the State may not rely on mere possession of the drug paraphernalia to 
prove Defendants' intent to use the same. State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 
1985). The State must not only show that Defendants had constructive possession 
of the drug paraphernalia, but the State has the additional burden of proving that 
the Defendants intended to use the drug paraphernalia. Speaking about a con-
trolled substance, the Utah Supreme Court in Fox explained the burden that the 
State must meet to prove constructive possession with an intent to use. 
[P]ersons who might know of the whereabouts of 
illicit drugs and who might even have access to 
them, but who have no intent to obtain and use 
the drugs cannot be convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance. Knowledge and ability to 
possess do not equal possession where there is 
no evidence of intent to make use of that knowl-
edge and ability. 
To find that a defendant had constructive posses-
sion of a drug or other contraband, it is necessary 
to prove that there was a sufficient nexus between 
between the accused and the drug to permit an 
inference that the accused had both the power 
and the intent to exercise dominion and control 
over the drug. (Emphasis supplied, citations 
omitted). 
Id. at 319. 
The Court went on to say that whether the sufficient nexus spoken of ex-
ists depends upon the facts of each case. But it is clear that mere ownership and 
occupancy "are not alone sufficient to establish constructive possession, especially 
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when occupancy is not exclusive. " Id. (Emphasis supplied). In addition to show-
ing ownership or occupancy, one or more of the following factors must be found: 
(1) incriminating statements of the accused; (2) incriminating behavior of the 
accused; (3) presence of the contraband, in this case the drug paraphernalia, "in a 
specific area over which the accused had control, such as a closet or drawer 
containing the accused's clothing or other personal effects;" and (4) "presence of 
drug paraphernalia among the accused's personal effects or in a place over which 
the accused has special control." Id. 
All of the cases since Fox in which either this Court or the Utah Supreme 
Court found that a sufficient nexus exists between the defendant and the contra-
band, allowing the trier of fact to infer that the defendant intended to use the con-
traband, contain circumstances or facts falling into one of the four categories above. 
For example, in State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
found that the defendant possessed marijuana with an intent to use because (1) the 
metal box containing the marijuana was stashed under the defendant's clothing 
next to his bed, (2) the metal box was locked with a key that was found in the 
Defendant's pants' pocket, (3) the defendant falsely denied possession of the key, 
and (4) the defendant also had drug scales on his book shelf. Id. at 132. Also, in 
State v. Phelps, 782 P.2d 196 (Utah App. 1989), this Court found that a sufficient 
nexus existed because (1) the defendant was the only occupant of the home, (2) the 
kitchen contained drug scales, and virtually each room of the home, including the 
closets, was equipped with sophisticated lighting, hydroponic growing systems, or 
otherwise used in the production of marijuana, and (3) "there was no evidence that 
anyone other than defendant then resided in, or had any access to, the interior of 
the home where all the marijuana production and processing was discovered." Id. 
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at 198. See also State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1224 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, the only evidence that the Defendants knew that the base-
ball cap contained drug paraphernalia, let alone that Defendants intended to use 
the same, was the fact that drug paraphernalia was found in a baseball cap hanging 
on the wall of what appeared to be the Defendants' master bedroom. The evidence 
clearly established that the officers conducting the search had no idea whether the 
baseball cap belonged to Mr. or Mrs. Deal or to their 17-year-old son. (R. at 66, 
p. at 35, 60). There was no evidence that the hat did not belong to others. There 
was no evidence that others did not have access to the room in which the hat was 
hanging. (R. at 66, p. at 59). The cap was not even taken in as evidence. (R. at 66, p 
at 35). Indeed, there were five or six baseball caps hanging next to the one contain-
drug paraphernalia (R. at 66, p. 60), and there was no evidence showing the juxta-
position of the hat containing the drug paraphernalia to other items belonging to 
the Defendants. (R. at 66, p. at 36). Moreover, the baseball cap was clearly a man's 
hat, not a woman's. (R. at 66, p. at 35). After reviewing the evidence, even the 
Court found that the baseball cap was located "in a common area," not a "specific 
area" over which the Defendants had control or among their "personal effects" or 
another area the Defendants' "special control." (R. at 66, p. at 64); see also Fox, 709 
P.2d at 319. The trial court had no evidence of the Defendants' knowledge of the 
baseball cap and the drug paraphernalia other than this, and such evidence alone 
will not permit reasonable minds to conclude thatt the Defendants knew the 
whereabouts of the drug paraphernalia and had an intent to use them. See Id. 
The trial court dismissed the possibility that the Defendants' son might 
have hidden the drug paraphernalia in the baseball cap because (1) the son would 
not have hidden the drugs in a place where the Defendants would have discov-
ered them, such as Defendants' own room, and (2) there were pornographic pic-
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tures in the room where the drug paraphernalia was found and it was, according 
to the trial court, unlikely that the son would frequent that area. (R. at 66, p. at 63). 
Yet, the son may have hidden the drug paraphernalia anywhere in the home, and 
the parents may have found it. The fact that the son hid the drug paraphernalia 
among the other baseball caps is simply more evidence that that area was a com-
mon area. Further, this situation does not present a catch 22 for the Defendants as 
the trial court suggests. (R. at 66, p. at 63). Even if the son hid the drug parapher-
nalia where the parents knew about them, that does not mean that the parents 
possessed the drug paraphernalia. The evidence of possession "must raise a rea-
sonable inference that the defendant was engaged in a criminal enterprise and not 
simply a bystander" Id, at 320. (Emphasis supplied). Mere knowledge is not 
enough to show possession. 
Further, it is "sufficiently inconclusive," "inherently improbable," and 
highly speculative that the son did not hide the drug paraphernalia among the 
other baseball caps simply because there were pornographic pictures in the room. 
See Cantu, 750 P.2d at 593. This is especially so since there was no evidence show-
ing the juxtaposition of the baseball caps to the pornographic pictures. 
(R. at 66, p. at 36). 
Finally, there was no evidence of incriminating statements or incrimi-
nating behavior of either of the Defendants before, during, or after the search. The 
only evidence before the trial court of what happened during the search is that 
after the police entered the home, Defendant James Deal exited the room contain-
ing the baseball cap, (R. 66, p. 32), and that the Defendants refused to talk to the 
police officers during and after the search. (R. 66, p. 57). 
This case is unlike Hansen, unlike Phelps, and unlike Watts. Even viewing 
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the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it is clear that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendants committed 
the crime of which they were convicted. See Cantu, 750 P.2d at 593. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request this Court to find 
that the trial court erred in failing to grant Defendants' Motion to Suppress, that 
the trial court erred in failing to grant Defendants1 Motion to Disclose the Confi-
dential Informant's Identity, and that the trial court erred in finding that Defen-
dants possessed the drug paraphernalia with the intent to use the same. Accor-
dingly, Defendants ask this Court to reverse their convictions. 
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AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bea r arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary' to the se-
curity of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war. but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
fUnreasonable sea rches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Prov is ions concern ing — 
Due process of law a n d jus t compensa t ion 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use. without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by lav.. and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by ju ry in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights re ta ined by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restrict ion of judicia l 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The 
President of the Senate shaU, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
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ia) pe^ons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge or 
lb> persons charged with a felonv while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felonv charge, when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felonv 
charge, or 
\c\ persons, charged v*\\h & cnme, as defined b \ 
statute, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the charge and the court finds bv clear 
and convincing evidence that the person would 
constitute a substantial danger to self or anv 
other person or to the communitv or is hkeh to 
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on 
bail 
(21 Person^ convicted of a crime are bailable pend 
ing appeal onlv as prescribed bv law IMM 
Sec. 9. {Excessive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments. 1 
Excessive bail shall not be required excessive fines 
shall not be imposed nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or impris 
oned shall not be treated with unnecessarv rigor 
18% 
S e c . 10. I T r i a l b> jur> ) 
In capi ta l case^ t he r igh t of t r ia l bv j u r \ shall n 
m a i n inviola te In cour t s of genera l jurisdict ion ex 
cept in capi ta l cases a iur \ shal l consist of eight ju 
rors In cour t s of inferior jur isdict ion a ju rv shall con 
sist of four j u r o r s In c r imina l cases the verdict shall 
be u n a n i m o u s In civil cases three-fourth^ of the ju 
ro rs m a v find a verdict A jurv in civil cases shall be 
wa ived u n l e s s d e m a n d e d 1896 
Sec. 11. (Courts open — Redress of injuries.1 
All courts shall be open, and every person for an 
injurv done to him in his person, propertv or reputa 
tion. shall have remedy by due course of law which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay, and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before anv tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
p a r t y 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and b> counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof to testify in his 
own behalf to be confronted bv the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial bv an impartial jurv of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted and the right to appeal in all cases In no 
instance shall anv accused person, before final judg-
ment be compelled to advance monev or fee^ to se 
cure the rights herein guaranteed The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a 
wife shall not be compelled to te-tih against her hus-
band nor a husband against hi* wiie nor shaN anv 
person be twice put in leopardv for the same offense 
1896 
Sec. 13 |Prosecut ion b \ information or indict-
ment — Grand jurv i 
Offenses heretoiore required to be prosecuted bv 
indictment, shall be prosecuted bv information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or bv indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment The for-
mation of the grand )ury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature 
1949 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.] 
T h e r i g h t of t h e people to be secure in t h e i r per-
sons, houses , p a p e r * a n d eflects aga ins t u n r e a s o n a b l e 
sea rches and s e i z u r e s shal l not be violated, and no 
w a r r a n t shal l i s sue b u t upon probable cause sup-
ported by oa th or a f f i rmat ion par t icu la r ly descr ib ing 
the place to be s e a r c h e d , and t h e person or t h i n g to be 
seized 1896 
Sec. 15. |Freedom of speech and of the press — 
Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the pre&» In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libel the truth mav be given in evidence 
to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jurv that the 
matter charged a* libelous is true, and was published 
with good motive* and for justifiable ends, the partv 
shall be acquitted and the iurv shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fac t 1896 
Sec. 16. (No impr i sonment for debt — Excep-
tion I 
There shall bt no imprisonment for debt except in 
ca^es of absconding debtors 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting ] 
All elections shall be free and no power civil or 
military, shall at anv time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage Soldiers, in time 
of war, may vote at their post of dutv in or out of the 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law 
1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im-
pairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed 
1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the same overt act ime 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil 
power.] 
The m i l i t a r y sha l l be in s t r ic t subordinat ion to t h e 
civil power, and no soldier in t ime of peace, sha l l be 
q u a r t e r e d in a n y h o u s e w i thou t the consent of t he 
owner , nor in t i m e of w a r except in a m a n n e r to be 
prescr ibed bv law 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden ] 
Neither slaverv nor involuntarv servitude except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the partv shall 
have been dulv convicted shall exist within this 
State 18% 
Sec. 22. [Private propertv for public use.] 
P r i v a t e proper tv ^hali not be t a k e n or damaged for 
public use w i t h o u t ju-a compensa t ion 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law sha l l be passed g r a n t i n g irrevocably any 
franchise, p r iv i l ege or i m m u n i t y 1896 
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"Drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, 
product, or material used, or intended for use, to 
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manu-
facture, compound, convert, produce, process, 
prepare, test, analyze, package, repackage, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to oth-
erwise introduce a controlled substance into the 
human bady \n v\a\al\c>T> <tf ChapteT Zl, T\i\e &8>, 
and includes, but is not limited to: 
(1) Kits used, or intended for use. in plant-
ing, propagating, cultivating, growing, or 
harvesting any species of plant which is a 
controlled substance or from which a con-
trolled substance can be derived; 
(21 Kits used, or intended for use, in man-
ufacturing, compounding, converting, pro-
ducing, processing, or preparing a controlled 
substance. 
(31 lsomerization devices used, or in-
tended for use. to increase the potency of any 
species of plant which is a controlled sub-
stance; 
(41 Testing equipment used, or intended 
for use. to identify or to analyze the strength, 
effectiveness, or purity of a controlled sub-
stance: 
(5» Scaie> and balances used, or intended 
for use. in weighing or measuring a con-
trolled substance; 
(61 Diluents and adulterants, such a^ qui-
nine hydrochloride, mannitol. mannited, 
dextrose and lactose, used, or intended for 
use to cut a controlled substance; 
ili Separation gins and sifters used, or in-
tended for use to remove twigs, seeds, or 
other impurities from marihuana; 
(81 Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons 
and mixing devices used, or intended for use 
to compound a controlled substance; 
(9> Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and 
other containers used, or intended for use to 
package small quantities of a controlled sub-
stance; 
(10) Containers and other objects used, or 
intended for use to store or conceal a con-
trolled substance, 
(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and 
other objects used, or intended for use to par-
enteral ly inject a controlled substance into 
the human body; and 
(12) Objects used, or intended for use to 
ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce mari-
huana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into 
the human body, including but not limited 
to: 
(ai Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, 
stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or 
without screens, permanent screens. 
hashish heads, or punctured metal 
bowls: 
(b» Water pipes; 
vc* Carbureters tubes and devices,, 
(d> Smoking and carburetion masks; 
(e> Roach clips: meaning objects used 
to hold burning material, such as a mar-
ihuana cigarette, that has become too 
small or too short to be held in the hand. 
if1 Miniature cocaine spoons and co-
caine vials; 
(g Chamber pipes; 
(h! Carburetor pipes; 
(i) Electric pipes; 
<j» Air-driven pipes; 
ik' Chillums; 
(11 Bongs: and 
imi Ice pipes or chillers. 1981 
58-37a-4. Considerations in de termining 
whether object is d rug pa raphe rna l i a . 
In deterrcus\u\£ whether an object \^ drug parapher-
nalia, the trier of fact, in addition to all other logi-
cally relevant factors, should consider: 
(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in 
control of the object concerning its use; 
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of 
anyone in control of the object, under any state or 
federal law relating to a controlled substance; 
(3) the proximity of the object, in time and 
space, to a direct violation of this chapter; 
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled 
substance; 
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled 
substance on the object: 
(61 instructions whether oral or written, pro-
vided with the object concerning its use; 
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the ob-
ject which explain or depict its use; 
(8) national and local advertising concerning 
its use: 
(9 < the manm : in which the object is displayed 
for sale: 
(10> whether the owner or anyone in control of 
the object is a legitimate supplier of like or re-
lated items to the community, such as a licensed 
distributor or dealer of tobacco products; 
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the 
ratio of sales of the object to the total sales of the 
business enterprise. 
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses 
of the object in the community; and 
(13) expert testimony concerning its use 1981 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful tor any person to use, or to pos-
sess with intent to use. drug paraphernalia to plant, 
propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, 
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, 
ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled sub-
stance into the human body in violation of this chap-
ter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess 
with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to 
deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, 
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, 
inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance 
into the human body in violation of this act. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers 
drug paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age 
who is three years or more younger than the person 
making the delivery is enilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful tor any person to place in this 
state in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other 
publication any advertisement. X owing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to i mote the sale of 
drug paraphernalia. Any person ho violates this 
subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1961 
